29 Μαΐου 2023

Κοσμογονία: Σεμινάριο στο Οιδιπόδειο Σύμπλεγμα


 

Το βιβλίο αυτό αποτελεί μια διάνοιξη του ορίζοντα του Οιδιπόδειου συμπλέγματος πέρα από την εκδοχή με την οποία το γνωρίζουμε. Αντί να προσκρούουμε στη συμπεριφορική εικόνα με την οποία είναι εδραιωμένο στη λαϊκή αντίληψη, αυτήν του παιδιού που έλκεται από τον γονέα του αντίθετου φύλου και που εκδηλώνει αντιζηλία προς τον γονέα του ίδιου φύλου, έχοντας τον Λακάν ως καθοδηγητή συναντιόμαστε με έναν είδους ζήλο του όντος που ομιλεί, με τον οποίον ποιεί κόσμους για να εγγράψει την εμπειρία της απόλαυσής του. Αποκτούμε μια γεύση του τι εστί επιθυμία.

Με προσανατολισμό την επιθυμία, η συγγραφή του παρόντος έργου αποτελεί ένα έμπρακτο εγχείρημα μετάδοσης της ψυχαναλυτικής εμπειρίας, μέσα από λογής καθημερινά περιστατικά που ακουμπούν μια ευρεία θεματολογία.


Κοσμογονία: Σεμινάριο στο Οιδιπόδειο Σύμπλεγμα

διαθέσιμο εδώ









ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΜΕΝΑ


ΣΕΜΙΝΑΡΙΟ ΣΤΟ ΟΙΔΙΠΟΔΕΙΟ ΣΥΜΠΛΕΓΜΑ


§1. Εισαγωγή: Το Σύμπλεγμα, ο Μύθος

§2. Οι Οιδιπόδειοι Γονείς

§3. Η Απόλαυση της Μητέρας

§4. Κληρονομικότητα

§5. Μύθοι που Αναμορφώνουν το Οιδιπόδειο

§6. Η Άδεια Θέση στην Επιθυμία της Μητέρας

§7. Ο Φροϋδικός Πατέρας ως Αντίζηλος

§8. Πατρική Μεταφορά και Φαλλικό Σημαίνον

§9. Ο Νόμος του Πατέρα και η Κοινωνία

§10. Το Σύμπαν της Μητέρας και του Πατέρα

§11. Το Τραύμα της Καταγωγής

§12. Από την Καταγωγή, στην Κοσμογονία



ΕΡΩΤΗΣΕΙΣ


Ε1. Πέραν του Φρόυντ

Ε2. Αυτοπεποίθηση

Ε3. Τα Γονικά Σημαίνοντα

Ε4. Διάγνωση, Σύμπτωμα

Ε5. Ο Φαλλός και το Όνομα του Πατρός

Ε6. Επώνυμο

E7. Υπερεγώ, Κληρονομιά

E8. Είναι ο Οιδίποδας Ψυχωτικός;

E9. Ο Φόνος του Πατέρα

E10. Ενοχή

E11. Διαχωρισμός

E12. Φαλλοκρατία στη Γλώσσα

E13. Άνδρας, Γυναίκα, Φαλλός

E14. Ντροπή

E15. Ένας Πανίσχυρος Πατέρας

E16. Χωρισμός

E17. Όταν το Παιδί Επιλέγει

E18. Τα Γονικά Σημαίνοντα στη Συνεδρία

E19. Απώλεια, Ενόρμηση

Ε20. Διάκλειση

Ε21. Εθισμός (Εξάρτηση)

Ε22. Αφάνιση

Ε23. Σεξουαλικές Θεωρίες και Συμπτώματα

Ε24. Φαντασίωση

Ε25. Φαντασίωση και Φαλλός

Ε26. Χριστιανισμός

Ε27. Θυσία

Ε28. Τραύμα

Ε29. Αποπλάνηση

Ε30. Η Σαγήνη της Γλώσσας

Ε31. Απώλεια Αγαπημένου Προσώπου

Ε32. Επιθυμία

Ε33. Ερωτισμός

Ε34. Στην Απόλαυση της Μητέρας

Ε35. Επιθυμία και Φαντασίωση

Ε36. Σύμπτωμα και Όνομα του Πατρός

Ε37. Ο Χρησμός

Ε38. Φαντασίωση και Χρησμός

Ε39. Γιατί η Φαντασίωση;

Ε40. Η Αυτού Μεγαλειότης το Βρέφος

Ε41. Το «Άλλο» Αντικείμενο (Φαλλός & Αντικείμενο α)

Ε42. Μεταβίβαση, Αγάπη

Ε43. Μη-Τέρας



ΕΥΡΕΤΗΡΙΟ

αγάπη, 7, 15, 31, 33-4, 56-7, 61-2, 66, 70, 82, 86, 102, 111, 118, 130-1, 141, 147-8, 155, 158, 170, 173-4

άγχος, 69, 98-9, 114, 136, 170

άγχος αποχωρισμού, 119-20, 129, 131, 

άγχος ευνουχισμού, 98-9, 150, 167  [βλ. επίσης, ευνουχισμός]

άγχος θανάτου, 119

Άλλος*

αιμομιξία, 13, 26, 28, 31, 40, 47, 49, 51, 57, 128, 131, 136, 139, 145

συμπεριφορισμός, 3, 33, 120, 171

συμπεριφορά, 4, 8, 12-3, 34, 50, 76, 79, 114

σύμπτωμα, 8-9, 35, 46, 53, 56, 61, 65, 68, 75-8, 91, 107, 117, 128, 133-5, 154-5, 157-9

συναισθηματική αποστέρηση, βλ. ιδρυματισμός

σχήματα λόγου

κυριολεξία, 13, 45, 121, 124, 127, 162

μεταφορά, 18, 20, 22, 36-8, 56, 59, 63, 125, 127, 129, 146, 166, 168

[βλ. επίσης, πατρική μεταφορά]

μετωνυμία, 43, 125


Freudian Letter

Άγγελος Τσιαλίδης / ΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ ΤΣΙΑΛΙΔΗΣ

13 Φεβρουαρίου 2022

The Image of Another

The following lecture has been given as an introduction to my recent publication of the book The Image of a Voice, to the gathering of The English Social Club (Cyprus) that has taken place on 12th February 2022 in Nicosia.

I will start with the word ‘patient’. It is a word that I usually avoid using in psychoanalysis, because the suffering of the person that is called as such (as patient) implies a defined normality, a set of specifications of ‘what should be’, from which that person is diverted. We may agree that this is true in the medical discourse, where there are documented precise parameters of how the body should function. Yet, if it is that we speak of the psychical world of the individual, how are we to define normality? Considering that there exists some truth in the proverb saying that each individual lives in his own world, then there is no such a thing as normality, and everyone is mad! Think of our everyday experience of misunderstandings between people, the need to explain ourselves so often, in such a way that along with the spoken word it becomes necessary to transmit our intentionality. There is always some part that remains untold: the desire with which something is expressed, whether it is expressed by being spoken or by being acted (the explanation of our word and of our actions; their context). Do we hence eliminate the notion of common sense? No and yes: No, because there needs to be a convention, a mutual agreement so that we can coexist, but since there needs to be such a convention then, by default, there is acceptance that each individual has their unique subjective world and therefore we have to set and agree on a common one. Thus, there is no definite normality in the strict sense of the word: Even the most formal expressions of our consensus which are the written laws of the city, the laws of the state, have their interpreters which we call lawyers or the court.

So, if we are to restore a ‘patient’ to a normality, which world does this normality refer to other than his own that has somehow failed and became cause if his distress!

However, what I like of the word ‘patient’ is the homonymity with another word: the Greek ‘pathos’. It is a word that is used intact in English vocabulary and speaks of the same failure or illness as expressed in the complaint of our fellow ‘patient’, although, I must admit that I had to look this up, it seems that there exists no etymological connection between them. Yet, the English translation of the Greek word provides us with another word that gives a different nuance to the word patient: We get the word ‘passion’, which is used to signify two distinct situations:

We speak of the passion of Christ, the extreme suffering, but we also use this word to express our liking about things that we pursue because they bring us extreme pleasure. What is common, though, between these two uses of the word is (a) the element of ‘the extreme’, and even further (b) that pathos, this extremity, is something so intimate to us yet it does not belong to ourselves: The pain or suffering is something located in our body, yet it is something we should abolish because it is not part of our body, we do not own it. The same goes for the passion for the things we like, because they are not things that we own but, contrariwise, it is these very things that own us (the passion owns us)! We all know very well of people who are driven into destruction because of their passions, the things they enjoy so much! We easily understand how passion, or things that own us, may easily become causes of suffering.

The first common thing the individual does when they address their suffering to a supposed specialist [I say supposed because there is no one that can guarantee a cure; there is no cure because there is nobody ill, as explained in the beginning] is that they provide a description of their distress, how they experience this suffering, which takes the value of a self-diagnosis e.g. they say they have anger, frustration, depression, panic attacks etc.: they know exactly what’s going wrong, i.e. what used to be normal for them and that it is not any more.

The second thing the ‘patient’ does [I use the word ‘patient’ because I have already explained my own intentionality of using it, beyond its common sense, by relating it to ‘pathos’] is to seek the cause of their distress in the surrounding world, because, as analysed before, pathos, although being so intimate to us, is not something that one can locate as part of themselves, i.e. within them. It is thus sought in what is considered as outside; a quest to find that element which escapes. It is sought into their relationships with others: their partners, their employers, their parents, their friends. They speak of the failure they experience in these relationships. A failure of what? Of an assumed identity via which they relate with the others. Even if the cause of suffering is described in the traumatic event of losing a beloved one, it is about what I was for this person, how I could see myself through them! It is about how my identity was lost with the beloved one. The investigation of one’s identity that relates them with the outer world forms questions, which are not stated so clearly or directly in the beginning, but they are refined in the process of the analysis, such as ‘what is it to be a child of my parents’, ‘a friend of my friends’, ‘a man for a woman’, ‘a woman for a man’. They are questions where the identity of the speaking subject is at stake in relation to someone else.

Every distress sums up as a crisis of identity, which arises not because of the individual all alone, but because of encountering conflicts with others; it is these conflicts that bring them to analysis. It is thus the environment that gives rise to this crisis, and the only reason is that the environment, the other person, is itself included in one’s identity. One’s own identity unavoidably passes through another – I will give further explanation of this in a moment.

We can even more say that the self-diagnosis that the subject undergoes in the beginning of their sessions is a temporary identity given to themselves because their own identity failed. [e.g. to get the identity of the 'depressed'; how to sustain themselves i.e. relate to the world otherwise? – without relating to the world, the world as well as themselves ceases to exist (every counterpart can only exist in relation to the other one).. Psychoanalytic experience proves that the identity of the depressed is the last resort of identity left before suicide.]

The above lead us to another question: What is identity? Identity, or our sense of self, is nothing but the qualities that one assumes for himself, his properties, which is a nice word that signifies not only one’s attributes, but also one’s belongings: the word property is about belonging. And what is the most fundamental paradigm for a property of the individual other than his/her own body! We say that we have a body!.. we have a body. We do not say that we are one, which itself poses a problem of identity: I cannot identify with the body, be that body, I can only have it. This is a completely different kind of body than the one that the medical discourse tries to treat; the medical discourse considers the individual to be the body. The subjective experience speaks otherwise: what characterises the body of the speaking being, that is to say what allows him/her to have it, is the description it receives for its qualities that unavoidably implement another, i.e. the qualities have reference to another person: how to be a man for a woman, or a woman for a man, how to be a child to my parents or a parent to my children etc. It is a certain identity that one assumes depending on who they address themselves to.

One question that is posed very often, is why we change the way we behave in different situations. An analysand for example spoke of the distress she has lived through during a time where various situations caused her to experience disorientation. She was feeling powerless back then, yet once her husband got ill she was transformed into a very powerful and agile person. She was surprised by this transformation! However, her previous distress was merely replaced by another one: the task to take care of her powerless husband. She became the powerful one when the description 'powerless' has shifted onto the person she relates to. So, what was truly described there, is her relationship where if one person is to be powerful, the other one must be powerless… in relation to whom the powerful is defined. Her suffering was not caused by the identity of the powerless one, but due to the fact that her identity was given by this relationship, i.e. the powerful with the powerless. Her identity did not change at all, because this identity unavoidably includes both counterparts. The other person is the mirror where the subject verifies their own image (their identity).

Crisis strikes in the form of non-recognition. Common complaints are “they don’t really know me” “they cannot accept me / love me for who I am” that very often lead to actions from the part of the subject that they declare as “they have seen myself in a way they didn’t know me” or even “I cannot recognise myself, it is not I who acted like this”. All these signify that the other person is inseparable part of oneself, because I cannot recognize myself unless the other verifies my assumed identity: I need him or her to verify my image. The sense of self, one’s image in the mirror, comes from another. This is equivalent to telling a joke, where it is not the comedian that makes it a joke but the one who listens and reacts to it with laughter, who verifies it as a joke (and the one who tells it a comedian).

Defining oneself as something that they are not, is the most common initial response that the subject gives to the question ‘who am I’ or ‘what do I want’. The individual says they are not understood and that nobody knows them, yet they are unable to state who they are unless they say ‘I am not this and that’, declaring within this negation (I am not) the identity that escapes. Here’s where pathos has its place: it comes to the place of that which escapes oneself, i.e. it is not part of one’s identity. Isn’t this the way that ‘pathos’ was defined in the beginning? i.e. an intimate part that escapes oneself. When identity escapes, pathos marks the place of the lost identity. Pathos is a signal: it is the body itself that speaks for the subject’s account! The word that remains unstated, the intentionality of the subject, what we call desire, is spoken through the body. This is why one’s identity as given by another becomes cause of suffering.

Here, we are brought to another question: How does the subject obtain that identity which seems to be so fragile? The mirror stage is the process via which our self-perception (both our self-identity and the perception of the body) is constituted, as an image in the mirror whose description is received from anOther place. The Image of a Voice addresses both the experienced psychoanalyst, but also the reader who has no psychoanalytical knowledge but they are interested in investigating the illusions of self-perception, false choices, forced modes of enjoyment and the desire which is at stake. This illustrated edition grounds itself on the experience of life and constitutes a step-by-step journey through Lacanian psychoanalysis.

30 Ιανουαρίου 2022

Το ωραίο άγχος

Ένα πολύ σύνηθες αίτημα του καθενός είναι «να αγαπηθώ για αυτός/ή που πραγματικά είμαι». Θα ήθελα να αναφερθώ σε αυτό το θέμα, το οποίο είναι άμεσα συσχετισμένο με διάφορα είδη συμπτωματολογίας (άγχος, κρίσεις πανικού κλπ.) τα οποία ενώ θα αποδίδαμε οπουδήποτε αλλού δεν είναι παρά ενδείξεις ότι το υποκείμενο αρπάζεται στο δικό του δόλωμα. Αυτή την αναφορά θα την κάνω παραθέτοντας έναν μύθο, μια αλληγορία, διατυπωμένο από τον ψυχαναλυτή Moustapha Safouan[1] σε ελεύθερη δική μου ερμηνεία η οποία περιλαμβάνει και σχόλιά μου[2]:

Αν βυθίσουμε ένα ραβδί στο νερό, φαίνεται να είναι λυγισμένο ή «σπασμένο». Αυτό λέγεται ότι είναι μια ψευδαίσθηση. Ωστόσο, με αυτόν τον τρόπο η εμφάνιση συμμορφώνεται με εκείνο που θα έπρεπε να είναι όπως δίνεται από την εμπειρία μας, και κατά συνέπεια και με αυτό που περιμένουμε. Αν το ραβδί φαινόταν κυρτό ή ίσιο ή οτιδήποτε άλλο, θα ήταν δικαιολογημένο να υποψιαστεί κάποιος ψευδαίσθηση. Κοινώς, άμα δεν παρατηρείται η αρχική ψευδαίσθηση, τότε μόνο υποψιαζόμαστε ότι υπάρχει κάποια ψευδαίσθηση: όταν δηλαδή παρατηρείται ψευδαίσθηση της ψευδαίσθησης.

Ας υποθέσουμε ότι ο μάγος, αυτός δηλαδή που δημιουργεί την οπτασία ετούτη στον παρατηρητή, είναι το ίδιο το ραβδί. Είναι ετούτο αρκετό για να αποκαλέσουμε το ραβδί ως υποκείμενο; Βεβαίως!.. αν το ραβδί βασανίζεται από το ερώτημα πώς θέλει να το δει ο παρατηρητής, σε ποια μορφή, δηλαδή γενικά ποια μορφή αρέσει περισσότερο σε εκείνον που το βλέπει. Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη αυτό, είναι εύκολο να φανταστεί κανείς ότι το ραβδί θα υιοθετήσει όλες τις πιθανές και φανταστικές μορφές, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της λυγισμένης μορφής, δηλ. της αληθινής, που όμως είναι ψευδώς αληθής ή ψευδώς ψευδής.

Ας υποθέσουμε ότι ο θεατής είναι ένας αδιόρθωτος ωραιολάτρης που πιστεύει ότι υπάρχει μια φιγούρα πιο τέλεια από οποιανδήποτε άλλη, π.χ. ότι ο κύκλος είναι το τέλειο σχήμα, και βλέποντας το ραβδί να παίρνει αυτήν τη μορφή βουτάει ο ίδιος στο νερό με την πεποίθηση ότι μπορεί να αρπάξει εκεί το αιώνια πολυπόθητο αντικείμενό του.

Είναι σαφές ότι το αποτέλεσμα θα είναι μια πλήρης αποτυχία.. και από τις δυο πλευρές: Καμία συμφιλίωση του ραβδιού με τον εαυτό του, διότι θα πρέπει να παρουσιάζεται ως κάτι άλλο από εκείνο που είναι, και καμιά συμφιλίωση μεταξύ του ραβδιού και του θεατή ο οποίος δεν πρόκειται να συναντήσει αυτό που περιμένει. Και οι δυο πλευρές όμως αφορούν το ίδιο το ραβδί, μια διπλή αποτυχία για το υποκείμενο, αφού το μόνο συμπέρασμα που θα βγάλει το ραβδί από αυτό που θεωρεί ως επιτυχημένο του δόλο (ή δόλωμα) είναι ότι ο θεατής δεν το αγαπά για τον εαυτό του, αλλά για την ψεύτικη εμφάνιση που έχει παρουσιάσει. Ίσως η μόνη επιτυχία είναι ότι θα καταλήξει σε ετούτη την αλήθεια. Θα είστε σίγουρα εξοικειωμένοι με την ερώτηση: «Μ’ αγαπάς;», δηλαδή, «είσαι σίγουρος ότι δεν είναι κάποιον άλλο ή, γιατί όχι, κάτι άλλο που αγαπάς;» ή «μπορώ ποτέ να είμαι σίγουρος γι' αυτό;».

Ας υποθέσουμε, αντίθετα, ότι ο παρατηρητής διαθέτει επαρκή επίγνωση της λειτουργίας που προκαλεί ετούτη την αίσθηση του ωραίου, ώστε να διατηρήσει την ψυχραιμία ή την απάθειά του μπροστά στην πράξη που προκαλεί την ψευδαίσθηση. Αργά ή γρήγορα το ραβδί θα καταλάβει ότι σε αυτή την πράξη, με την οποία αλλάζει τη μορφή του για να αρέσει, διατρέχει τον κίνδυνο να μην μάθει ποτέ τι είναι το ίδιο «αληθινά», διότι σε σχέση με την ψεύτικη εμφάνιση με την οποία γίνεται αντιληπτό από τον παρατηρητή ως ωραίο, συλλαμβάνει τη μορφή της αληθινής του ύπαρξης ως κάτι ξένο. Επομένως, συνειδητοποιεί ότι διατρέχει τον κίνδυνο να μην μάθει ποτέ ούτε ποιος είναι, ούτε αν πραγματικά αγαπιέται, αποθέτωντας τη γνώση του «τι πραγματικά θέλω» στο «τι θέλει να δει από εμένα ο παρατηρητής» εξ ου και το άγχος του. Το άγχος δηλαδή παρουσιάζεται ως ένδειξη ότι το υποκείμενο δεν οδεύει προς την επιθυμία του.

Υπάρχει μόνο μία λύση: να αναγνωρίσουμε το στρέβλωμα της μορφής του ως νόμο, νόμο τόσο της εμφάνισής του όσο και του πώς αναγκαία παρουσιάζεται στον θεατή ως «ατελής», ο οποίος επίσης θα υποθέσουμε ότι είναι βουτηγμένος στο ίδιο νερό αφού είναι από τον ίδιο πηλό φτιαγμένος.


[1] Moustapha Safouan, “Is the Oedipus Complex Universal?”, in m/f: a feminist journal, No.5&6, London, 1981, p.85-86. (μτφ. δικιά μου)

[2] Περισσότερα σχόλια και ανάλυση της ψευδαίσθησης της εικόνας, στο βιβλίο μου:

Angelos Tsialides, The Image of a Voice: The Mirror Stage of Jacques Lacan, Scribe of the Letter, 2021. (Μπορείτε να το προμηθευτείτε, εδώ)


08 Ιανουαρίου 2022

The Image of a Voice: The Mirror Stage of Jacques Lacan

It has been since forever that man as a speaking subject has used metaphors to describe the world. Jacques Lacan is the first to bring this fact into a psychoanalytic context, noting that this very metaphorization draws reference from another metaphor that is primordial, where the individual takes his mirror image as a representation of his being.


Man is granted access to his body through his mirror reflection that he mistakes as his own self, which means that the speaking being defines themselves by what characterises that image. The mirror stage is about the constitution of oneself that takes place through the process where the subject attempts to identify with the locus from which the image receives its description.

This book illustrates the mirror stage of Jacques Lacan not only in the metaphorical sense of the word, but also literally: Plurality of illustrations supports the text that is full of examples from everyday life, popular stories, mythology and psychoanalytic cases. The Image of a Voice addresses not only the audience that desires to be introduced to the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis, but also those whose desire has led them to the path of psychoanalytic formation, whether practicing analysts or not.

The Image of a Voice is published and available here


08 Απριλίου 2021

Simulation

I have recently come across a debate over the simulation hypothesis which roughly says that the universe is an artificial simulation, just like a computer simulation, and that reality is a virtual one like The Matrix. My intention here is not to explain the formation of one’s reality, a subject that is addressed into my publication on Jacque Lacan’s concept of the Mirror Stage, but to make an intervention that adds to a previous article I wrote.

The prementioned debate gives rise to the question of why, independently of whether the simulation hypothesis is true or false, it would be so important for someone to believe in or even to go against such an idea - “against” is still a dependence on its existence. Would this affect their way of living? We could agree on the aspect of our desire to find out how things work, and via these discoveries construct tools that will assist our life. Yet, the current insistence takes place over a topic that has no practical application but only bears a satisfaction for verifying or falsifying one’s limitations. We may also wonder here as well, which limitations?

Hence the simulation hypothesis is only sustained in its philosophical dimension, that is to say in the ancient play of thought invented by man to address their premordial questions that concern their subjectivity and ultimately life itself. Removing ourselves from the debate of true or false, we can very well say that the exploration of the universe is at the same time an exploration of our consciousness.  Literally, because the universe we know is not what it is in itself but what we merely perceive, observe, measure, describe or puzzle ourselves onto. In these terms, the universe as we know it is already a simulation of our thought in the same way that Descartes stated “I think therefore I am”. Adding this to the fact that thought itself is part of the universe, we can even further say that universe and thought are reflections of one another, summed up in Alan Watts’ beautiful statement “You are the universe experiencing itself.”

However, what is usually omitted in the philosophical thought is the dimension of enjoyment and the desire of the speaking being. What we can thus say if one puts too much stress on the belief of a universe as simulation, is that they undoubtedly require it as a support, but to what? Not in order to explain the universe as simulation of their thought, but to rather make up a reasoning for their thought as simulation of something else, i.e. how they find themselves living remotely, in a third person’s perspective, just like a simulation, whereby their thought process unwillingly takes their life out of control and their true desire out of track. Proving that the universe is a simulation would then mean unveiling the truth of their unwanted choices and actions, something that is not always clear at first glance. If, for example, one would lose the motivation for their actions in the case of discovering that the universe is a simulation, it means that they never wanted to perform those actions, which were therefore directed from the very beginning by whatever or whoever is supposed to control the simulation, and, by extension, controls their very thought!

Would, then, the attachment on such a hypothesis mean that one is searching for a reason to stop their unwanted actions, or would they simply go on by accusing something beyond themselves for their decisions? The answer is irrelevant, because in either case what is at stake is that one denies their responsibility for the actions they never take! Which actions? These towards the things that cannot be found in any sort of studies which attempt to simulate what it is for one to live by a univers-al formula for well-being with statistics and numbers, namely, the very actions that constitute one’s own way of breathing and that we call “desire”.

For those who are truly in line with their desire, the non-existence of a simulation is irrelevant too.

26 Μαρτίου 2021

The Heav(enl)y Reward

It is a fact that setting a goal for oneself to aim at, produces the corresponding mental coordinates that navigate their actions to its achievement and a motive that provides orientation for the work in progress. Yet why is it so common that people lose themselves in the course of this work, usually as a sense of failure and disappointment, or even as what has been named burnout over the last few years? Multiple motivational quotes are then invocated to assist the suffering person, by further encouraging their work… and their life whose definition has become identical to the word work: “Never give up!” “The only barrier is You!” “Believe in yourself!” “Become a better You!” etc. only for one to come across the same affects that sooner or later happen to re-emerge, sometimes even more powerfully.

Our life experience enlightens us with all the answers from which we draw natural conclusions: Why would there be a burnout if not by some forced labour? And why would there be any disappointment at all, if not due to a failed expectation of being rewarded by our efforts? It is of course inevitable that one demands a reward for their efforts if what they do is something they don’t want to, namely, something they are forced to do.

We may hence well justify that the goal which has initially been set and which directs the subject’s actions has never truly been something the subject themselves desired, or at least not on their own terms. And what’s more, that once the subject is led to the belief that this is their own desire, then the illusion is formed that they like working for it!
 
This is what happens when the goal is based on some sort of idealisation, that is to say a formed ideal image of myself, a future perfect version of me, the one I would like to be and thus I am currently not. “I am not”, signifies that one is negated when they identify with that image: losing any sort of presence in their life by being absorbed into the perfection of the image of a future self.

Trying to become a better version of oneself towards ideality means that the ideal image only motivates work that comes with the promise of some payback, i.e. to be rewarded with something that will complete their image of perfection. Within that discourse there is anticipation that one will be able to get enjoyment once the requirements of the ideal are fulfilled. Consequently, if the reward is not received, the body suffers because the promised object of payback is not received and the image remains incomplete, in other words, fragmented. But isn’t it an oxymoron that the body is experienced as heavy when a part is missing? Why does this happen? Because one is unable to perceive the whole operation of the ideal, namely, that what is experienced as missing from one’s body is not the lack of any anticipated object but the excess of labour itself, i.e. the expended effort towards the ideal; it is precisely because of this effort that one demands compensation. The subject is caught in a vicious circle, stemming from the fact that an ideal image is introjected as one’s true identity. Vicissitudes come by definition in one’s life once the establishment of the ideal image takes place.

How could all this be simplified more, if not by saying that one demands payment only when working for someone other than themselves! The subject is so consumed and absorbed in this process, that in the statement “I am doing this for myself”, the self does not even refer to themselves as a subject but to how they are objectified for some Other who nominates and thus chooses the ideal that the subject takes as their identity: this is precisely the heaviness in taking (i.e. taking the identity of the ideal) which produces the effect of an image of the body that is missing something. As such, the ideal represents the Other incarnating the ‘law’ or ‘rules’ that conduct (a great synonym for order) the subject’s direction of work, and from whom the reward is demanded.

Psychoanalyst Petros Patounas describes true desire as “asking nothing from no one”. Indeed, working towards one’s own desire does not have any reward as its aim, that is to say any object that would complete their body and bring enjoyment, because the very act of working is what makes heaven and defines the body (Patounas calls this mode of being ErgOn). It is an enjoyment independent of the Other. The expectation of a reward only comes when someone acts according to rules for trade, whereby a certain measure is applied as a unit of exchange that defines the fair compensation for the subject’s sacrifice. A sacrifice of what? That of their desire: The subject demands a reward as compensation for giving up their own desire. This of course shouldn’t be misinterpreted as “I do not give, because I don’t want to get anything back from anyone”, because it is still caught up in the discourse of fair exchange: “I don’t give” is in this case related to “I don’t get… a fair exchange”.
 
And, if this is pushed to an extreme, if one declares that something they want is of their own desire but they do nothing to achieve it, or find all sorts of excuses while blaming others, then not only is it not their desire, because blaming others means they ask others for something, but they also demand to be instantly rewarded for exchanging their subjectivity with the idealised image they believe they want.

An honourable statement against the anticipation of life in a future self, would be something that one usually hears in the aforesaid motivational quotes, but which is mostly derived from eastern thought, that one should live in the present. There is a nice play on words here whereby people in their ideal and perfect image lose their present, in both its meanings: the present as temporal and the present as gift. Gift is a nice word for the reward itself, the gift of life. Yet, this quote is often misinterpreted into another idealisation whereby one may short-circuit the ideal image into a demand to acquire absolute enjoyment now as if there is no tomorrow, which is to say that everything will end. What an ideal way to reach a goal! True present is timeless, a never ending one.

It isn’t hard for someone to distinguish what is aligned with their desire from that which is caught up in an ideal, because the experience of their effects on the body speaks for itself: Desire is about aligning one’s actions to whatever supports their breath just by doing it, that is to say, their very act is their own breath. For example, if there is any sort of pressure in helping or serving a fellow person, then there is a hidden expectation of respect and reward, even if this reward is expected from the justice of a God.
 
Christian tradition in its own terms uses the word Theosis (Θέωσις) to describe the destination of all humans, the ultimate goal, whereby one becomes a god. This is a goal beyond any idealisation, because one can only become a god when their deeds do not demand any reward from (any form of) God. And it is certain at this point that the original sin, i.e. eating the fruit that would make one a god, has been from the beginning all about aiming at the deification of oneself that has nothing to do with ‘Τheosis’ – a magnificent word for ‘Desire’ –, but with the assimilation of the object that would complete one’s ideal image to perfection.

The essay above is part of the book The Image of a Voice which is available here


'Adam and Eve'. Illustration by Stella Violari,
illustrator of the book The Image of a Voice


10 Μαρτίου 2021

Split: Desire, a “bad” Valentine

 “I love you, but, because inexplicably I love in you something more than you - the object petit a - I mutilate you.

Jacques Lacan, Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis


Let’s simplify this by replacing the term “object petit a” with a set of desirable characteristics fantasised by the lover on the beloved person. The beloved one is here reduced into the specific part of themselves described by these idealised attributes, which for the moment we will call “good”, a part that is consequently mutilated from the whole of that person. The lover falls in love with the “good” in the beloved one and as such, “good” is what defines “love”, the “good love” [I use quotation marks to signify the idealised definitions the words receive]. In short, the fantasy of the lover chops some part of the other person, and with that part they form the whole image of the beloved.

But what happens to the part that remains outside the mutilated one? It obviously cannot be really separated; it can only be aborted in the ideal scenario where the prementioned mutilation takes place, the scenario that is called fantasy. The other part, therefore, accompanies the idealised “good” part as a shadow that every now and then makes its presence as a surprise, quite often being in the form of “bad” that brings problems within the relationship. But since the “good” had already formed some person, our beloved person, then the “bad” is perceived as another personage that the lover is unable to recognise in the beloved one and thus can only make sense as something off-character.

Hence, the beloved person is split into a double personality whereby the personality of the “good” and loveable traits is separated from the personality of the “bad” and unwanted traits. In other words, the “bad” traits are encountered as a distinct person that the lover believes they can get rid of, as if they are dealing with two persons and all they have to do is expel the one they don’t like. Even further, the lover cannot accept that the other person carries both “good” and “bad”, that is to say they are mistaken about their choice of the beloved one, because admitting the “bad” in the other means that they are at the same time admitting the “bad” or “fault” within themselves, i.e. that they picked the wrong person to love. Or, by extension, that this bad choice of them is made by a bad self whom they cannot identify with, which is the encounter with their own double personality or split-character: the good one as I would like to be seen and the bad one that must remain hidden from sight. The other person, thus, functions as a mirror in which the subject attempts to see themselves the way they want to be seen, which means that the idealisation and the ideal version of themselves is formed according to someone else’s gaze (a wish to be seen by whom?): the gaze of the Other. The ideal has never been their own and the resulted split is another name for the division of the subject.

But in the final analysis, the failure happens not because the hidden or repressed part makes its presence, i.e. the return of the repressed, but precisely because of the very idealisation of the attributes that causes the production of the repressed part: The “good” of the ideal attributes has been forcefully projected from the lover to the beloved right from the beginning by naming them as such and such, so the problem is not the “bad”, but the definition of “good” which consequently leaves a hidden part outside the visual field, the part that is then nominated as bad. The idealisation in the gaze of the Other makes the experience of one’s true desire, i.e. what doesn't fall into that gaze, as an encounter with something bad. After all, it is in the “bad” of the other that usually appears the realisation that this person is not for me, and perhaps that the relationship is built on idealised standards, or even further with analysis that this person does not support my desire. And if I only see “bad” in the unveiled side of the beloved, then it means that I cannot support their desire either, i.e. the part which is beyond my fantasy. At that point, a choice has to be made whether one opts for the “good” as defined by the ideal / Other with all its consequences, over being guided by their desire. Not an easy choice, because their desire only exists in what was previously characterized as aborted or unwanted part of the loveable in the ideal.

It is thus very common that people choose to turn away from their desire, preserving it in the field of the “bad”, and instead, continue staring deeper into the “good” of their beloved one which holds the ideal image of themselves. Let’s repeat that in these terms, a false definition of “love” is given, becoming synonymous to the idealised “good”. Thus, in the function of the other person as one’s mirror, 'I love the good in the other because I want to see myself / to be seen as good', which is equal to 'I love in the way I assume myself seen as loveable'. Needless to say, the “good” speaks only of a good defined by the ideal, the good of the Other and not any good for the subject. Love” too!... within the definition is receives. The ideal binds and blinds the subject into the idealised false love in the service of the Others gaze (the demand to be seen in a certain way) and allows no space of desire and creation away from that. In fact, the terms “good” and “bad” here appear inverted as far as how they support the desire of the subject. The subject receives their own message back from the Other in an inverted form, Lacan says.

An analysand the other day was describing the major problems of his relationship, but then saying that he doesn’t want to break up because in his relationship there is much love. One obviously wonders how there can exist so serious problems in a relationship if the two persons love each other so much. Responding to the question about what he means when he says “love”, he states: “Love is to support each other; it is to feel each other’s pain”. This person’s true relationship was not with the other person as such, but with pain, becoming an irreducible condition for him to love the other and for himself to be loved, in such a way that in order to support this kind of love they had to inflict pain to each another so that they love each other by feeling each other’s pain. Pain thus here appears in the place of “good”, the idealised love, whereby “I love in you something more than you”. This analysand wasn’t led into analysis because of any sort of suffering brought by this fantasy, but because his partner started denying her place of pain, which for the analysand was the encounter with the part where his fantasy fails.

Would all the above mean that there should be no disagreements in a relationship? This is not true, unless one concludes into another sort of idealisation, that of the ideal relationship. On the contrary, what is highlighted is that disagreements unveil something of the way each partner’s fantasy functions. One can learn so many things about themselves through their own reflection encountered in the beloved one. So, the true question here is: does this relationship only support each other’s ideal image or is there a space of true desire, which means true love beyond the idealised one, i.e. the ideal that forces one to be seen in a certain way in order to be loved? And once you find out, what do you do about it?


[More about the function of the mirror in my upcoming publication on Lacan's concept of the Mirror Stage]